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SHOOTING BLANKS: THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S ENTRANCE INTO THE GREAT
PATENT TROLL HUNT
Daniel A. Tagliente*
I. INTRODUCTION
Many regard the American patent system as a great institution that
provides incredible value to the United States economy.1 This notion
is not universal, however, and some believe that the patent system does
not provide value or should be abolished altogether.2 Despite those
who discount its value, the American patent system has many benefits.
Patent-intensive industries provide over 7,000,000 jobs3 and, along with
other intellectual property fields, account for up to 34.8 percent of the
country’s gross domestic product (GDP).4 Many patent-intensive
industries are made up of large corporations with extensive patent
portfolios, which are used to generate profit from licensing fees as well
as to protect against infringers.5 Although the patent system is
fundamentally important to many of these large corporations that may
have hundreds or thousands of patents issued each year,6 the patent
system can be just as valuable to individual inventors and small
*

J.D. Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.S., 2010, Lehigh
University; B.S., 2009, Lehigh University.
1
See Congressman Lamar Smith, Protecting Americas Ideas, HOUSE.GOV (Apr. 20,
2007),
http://lamarsmith.house.gov/media-center/columns/protecting-americasideas (“Strengthening intellectual property leads to economic growth, job creation
and the type of creativity that has made America the envy of the world.”). See also ECON.
AND STATISTICS ADMIN. & U. S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.
uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf (explaining the estimated
financial impacts of intellectual property on the U.S. economy).
2
See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899 (2002).
3
ECON. AND STATISTICS ADMIN. & U. S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note
1.
4
ECON. AND STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note
1 at vii.
5
See Patrick Thomas & Anthony Breitzman, Patent Power 2012, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Dec. 3, 2012, 17:11 GMT), available at http://spectrum.ieee.org/ns/pdfs/2012
Patentscorecard2a.pdf (depicting the patent power scorecard).
6
Id.
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businesses trying to protect the rights associated with their innovation
and ingenuity.
For some small businesses and individual inventors, the patent
system embodies the “American Dream” because of the way in which it
rewards the individual who comes up with an innovative idea and
succeeds in reducing it to practice through his or her own intellectual
efforts, hard work, and determination.7 The patent system operates in
a quid pro quo nature, granting an inventor the right to exclude
“others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention”8
in exchange for a fully-enabling disclosure of how the invention can
be made or used.9
Over the course of the last several years, much of the intellectual
property community has realized that the patent system is not perfect.
Some have suggested that the patent system must evolve in order to
keep up with the ever-changing nature of technology and of the global
market.10 There have been several recent attempts to institutionalize
this evolution of the patent system. For instance, regulatory aspects of
the patent system have been consistently strengthened since 2000,
causing the patent system as a whole to move away from several of the
traditional principles upon which it has previously relied, and instead,
to be subject to stricter governmental controls.11 Although these
controls may intend to create a more efficient environment, they may
actually restrict the free market and hinder innovation.12

7

See Campbell Chiang, A Putative Inventor’s Remedies to Correct Inventorship on A
Patent, 2 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 20 (2003).
8
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
9
See JOHN SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 13:5 (2d
ed. 2003) (discussing the quid pro quo nature of the patent system).
10
See Manny Schecter, The Emerging Global Market for Intellectual Property, FORBES
(Apr. 18, 2012, 12:47 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/04/18/
the-emerging-global-market-for-intellectual-property (“IP systems must continue to
evolve to help foster a robust market.”). See also Colleen V. Chien, Turn the Tables on
Patent Trolls, FORBES (Aug. 9, 2011, 11:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
ciocentral/2011/08/09/turn-the-tables-on-patent-trolls. (“Of course, from a societal
perspective, patent law needs to evolve to meet the changing needs of modern society.
That means finding a balance between adequately protecting innovation while
reducing the payday for those pursuing litigation over patents held on small advances
in complex technologies.”).
11
See Mark A. Lemley, The Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109,
110 (2013) (discussing the change of the patent system from an institution guided by
common law principles to one guided by regulatory principles).
12
Id.
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Of the numerous developing issues within the intellectual
property community, one of the more recent and pervasive concerns
has been both the impact of, and the question of how to address, the
“non-practicing entity” (NPE) and the “patent assertion entity” (PAE)
within the context of the overall patent system. Although these groups
have been recognized since at least the early 1990s,13 they have received
much greater attention in recent years. The actual terms “nonpracticing entity” and “patent assertion entity” are neutral
descriptions,14 but NPEs and PAEs are also commonly referred to by
the pejorative term “patent trolls.”15 Rather than residing in solitude
throughout remote mountain communities,16 these types of trolls often
seek refuge under the shelter of a “shell” company and are armed with
an arsenal of issued, but non-practiced, patents. Patent trolls—and the
closely related group of “patent privateers”17—are often criticized for
misusing and manipulating the patent system in a way that limits,
impedes, and generally hurts both trade and innovation by leveraging
patents without advancing science or technology.18 These criticisms
are based on the fact that “patent trolls” often do not produce or sell
actual products or inventions and are therefore “non-practicing.”
Instead of simply protecting their legal rights, these entities are often
viewed as extortionists who choose to assert a patent solely in order to
sue others, rather than practicing the invention on the open market.19
13

See Brenda Sandburg, Battling the Patent Trolls, THE RECORDER, July 30, 2001
(discussing how the first known public use of the term “patent troll” was in 1993 by
Peter Detkin, former general counsel at Intel, who created the term as a result of being
sued for libel after describing a group as “patent extortionists”).
14
See Brief for Time Warner Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae supporting Petitioners,
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL
235010, at *5.
15
Lamina Packing Innovations, LLC v. Monsieur Touton Selection, Ltd., 12 CIV.
5039 CM, 2013 WL 1421781, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013).
16
The origin of trolls can be traced back to Scandinavian folklore, in which they
were depicted as unfriendly, hermit-like, powerful, and dumb beings that often ran
into conflict with humans, although they prefered to live an isolationist lifestyle,
seeking refuge in mountains and caves.
17
Many consider “patent Privateers” to be a variant of a typical patent assertion
entity. These entities are authorized by a patent owner or are sold patent rights with
the intention of attacking another company, usually a competitor of the original
patent holder. See Thomas L. Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by
Corporations and Investors: IP Privateering & Modern Letters of Marque & Reprisal, 4
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (2012).
18
Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP.
L. BULL. 1, 7 (2005).
19
See eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that some “firms use patents not as a basis for producing and
selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees”).
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The matter is complicated, however, by the fact that a patent holder
who does not practice his invention is still fully within his rights to file
a lawsuit if his patent has been infringed.20
Often, the primary goal of NPEs and PAEs is to produce a revenue
stream by forcing companies that sell products which may be similar
to the claimed invention to surrender licensing fees.21 With the costs
of defending allegations of improper patent use reaching up to $5
million,22 most defendants, particularly small and mid-sized businesses
or individuals, would rather reach a settlement or licensing agreement
than litigate.23 Many consider this strategy of suing an alleged
infringer—particularly a small entity that lacks the financial resources
necessary to put on a defense—and forcing it into a settlement
agreement to be an abusive practice.24 Even when a defendant does
not quickly seek a settlement, and a patent troll’s lawsuit goes to court,
the patent troll receives a significant procedural advantage because the
United States Code tends to favor the patentee, as demonstrated by the
fact that patent holders receive a presumption of validity for their
patents—an assumption that the defendant must then refute.25 This
business model results in a flourishing patent troll industry.26
Identifying a “patent troll” is not always an easy task since there is
no official legal definition for the term, and parties disagree as to the
term’s true definition.27 Courts have tried to define the term, and
although definitions may vary, many accept that the term “patent troll”
usually refers to an entity “who enforces patent rights against accused
infringers in an attempt to collect licensing fees, but does not
20

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006).
See eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that some “firms use patents not as a basis for producing and
selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees”).
22
Jim Kerstetter, How Much Is That Patent Lawsuit Going to Cost You?, CNET NEWS
(Apr. 5, 2012, 10:00 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-32973_3-57409792-296/howmuch-is-that-patent-lawsuit-going-to-cost-you/.
23
Id.
24
See, e.g., John Malcolm & Andrew Kloster, A Balanced Approach to Patent Reform:
Addressing the Patent-Troll Problem Without Stifling Innovation, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan.
9, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/01/a-balanced-approachto-patent-reform-addressing-the-patent-troll-problem-without-stifling-innovation
(comparing actions filed by patent trolls to other “nuisance” lawsuits in which the
primary goal of initiating litigation is to extract a settlement).
25
See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
26
See Charles E. Schumer, A Strategy for Combating Patent Trolls, WALL ST. J. (June
12, 2013, 6:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323844
804578531021238656366.
27
See Mark A. Lemley, Missing the Forest for Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2125
n.41 (2013).
21
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manufacture products or supply services based on the patents in
question.”28 The term has also developed a pejorative connotation
through its use within the intellectual property community, although
it has sometimes also been adopted—or even embraced—by those
whom the term is meant to describe.29
The intellectual property community has an ongoing debate as to
whether “patent trolls” pose a legitimate threat to the patent system
and to the economy.30 While there are some who believe that patent
trolls are nonthreatening or actually benefit the economy,31 other
analysts estimate that patent troll activity may cost the American
economy approximately $29 billion32—or, in some other estimates, up
to $80 billion33—in lost growth each year. Based on this information
and the way in which patent trolls often intend to extract settlements
and licensing fees from sometimes innocent parties,34 this Comment
operates under the presumption that patent trolls do pose a legitimate
threat to innovation and to the economy, and that their abusive
litigation tactics should be eliminated in order to protect and benefit
the United States patent system.
Courts have also acknowledged the difficulty involved in defining
what exactly makes an entity a “patent troll”—a complex
determination that is compounded by the fact that there is significant
disagreement as to whether or not patent trolls pose a real problem.35
Despite this uncertainty, however, some of these same courts have
28

Internet Ad Sys., LLC v. Opodo, Ltd., 481 F. Supp. 2d 596, 601 (N.D. Tex. 2007).
See J.P. Mello, Legal Update, Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 388, 388-89 (2006).
30
Compare id. at 388, with James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the
Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56
EMORY L.J. 189 (2006) (arguing that patent trolls benefit society by acting as
intermediaries in the patent market, resulting in liquidity and increased efficiency in
the patent market).
31
See McDonough III, supra note 30, at 338 (arguing that patent trolls benefit
society by acting as intermediaries in the patent market, resulting in liquidity and
increased efficiency).
32
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 387 (2014).
33
Katherine Lugar, Patent Troll Lawsuits Cost U.S. Economy $80 Billion Annually,
HOTEL NEWS RES. (Oct. 29, 2013), www.hotelnewsresource.com/article74655.html.
34
See Malcolm & Kloster, supra note 24.
35
Overstock.com, Inc. v. Furnace Brook, LLC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1223 (D.
Utah 2005). (“Unlike Congress, this court is not in a position to know how many patent
trolls exist and how often they send letters to potential infringers (except those in their
own state) in the hope that the letters’ recipients will opt to license their patent instead
of paying potentially staggering litigation defense costs . . . . These matters, however,
must be left to either Congress to resolve as a matter of statutory change or to the
Federal Circuit as a matter of case law change.”).
29
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acknowledged that they are not properly situated to make this
determination, and that the matter should be left to Congress, which
is better positioned to address issues related to patent trolls and the
patent system as a whole.36 One exception to this statement is the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC),37 which has statutory
jurisdiction allowing it to hear appeals arising from decisions made by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).38 The CAFC
has taken several steps to reduce abusive patent litigation,39 but it has
not offered a complete solution. Despite its authority, the CAFC itself
has stated that it must defer to Congress on issues of “judgment in
effectuating and maintaining a patent system.”40 The regulation and
policing of patent trolls likely falls within the scope of this statement.
The Supreme Court of the United States has also echoed this
sentiment.41 The judiciary’s suggestion to leave the power of policing
and governing the patent system to Congress is not novel, however, as
the United States Constitution explicitly gives this power to Congress.42
Despite Congress’ enumerated power over the patent system43 and
the deference given to Congress by the courts, police action against
“patent trolls” now has a new enforcer—the Executive Branch.
President Barack Obama entered the great patent troll hunt in July
2013 when the White House issued a press release and fact sheet
regarding the Executive Branch’s stance on the “patent troll”
problem.44 In the statement, the White House declared that it believes
that patent trolls “don’t actually produce anything themselves,”45 and
that the main strategy employed by patent trolls is “to essentially
leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort
some money out of them.”46 This understanding is consistent with the
definitions of patent troll discussed supra. In addition to defining
36

Id.
Id.
38
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006).
39
See, e.g., Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., C 10-02066 SI, 2012 WL 1534065,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2012) (holding that a request for fee shifting does not require
a “smoking gun,” but instead, requires only a misguided belief based on zealousness).
40
Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg. Inc., 702 F.3d 624, 632–33 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
41
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204–05 (2003).
42
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
43
Id.
44
Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on HighTech Patent Issues (June 4, 2013) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues
[hereinafter White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet].
45
Id. at 2.
46
Id.
37
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patent trolls, the White House also issued a slate of seven legislative
suggestions and five executive actions that it believes should be
implemented in order to curb the patent troll problem.47 Although
the Executive Branch’s understanding of what constitutes a patent troll
is consistent with generally accepted definitions, the White House’s
plan to solve the patent troll problem, as will be discussed infra, is not
focused on the generally accepted core issue of abusive patent
litigation.
Previous debate surrounds the issue of whether the patent system
should be dictated by executive action and administrative law
principles or, conversely, be subject to judicial review.48 Although the
President is attempting to eliminate patent trolls and has not exceeded
his Constitutional powers by merely stating his policy objectives,49 his
entrance into the realm of patent trolls is unlikely to bring about
significant change or to benefit the United States patent system.
Instead, many of the proposals, particularly those that have yet to be
thoroughly considered by Congress, are more likely to hurt the patent
system by reducing its efficiency and making it more difficult for small
businesses, individual inventors, and other legitimate small entities to
seek, obtain, and exercise the rights associated with patent protection.
Additionally, many of the suggestions are likely to further compound
the pre-existing problems facing the American patent system, such as
the incredible application backlog within the USPTO50—a problem
that has only been exacerbated by sequestration51—as well as a record
number of patent cases being brought through the courts.52
47

Id.
See generally Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 127 (2000).
49
Previous Presidents have made statements regarding patent policy, but only
rarely. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy, Presidential Memorandum and Statement on
Government Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,943, 10,943-44 (Oct. 10, 1963) (discussing
issues related to government acquisition of patent rights for inventions made as a result
of a government contract).
50
As of December 2013, there were 595,361 unexamined patents awaiting
examination in the USPTO. The USPTO maintains a dynamic webpage displaying
various performance measures for patent examination. See Data Visualization Center,
USPTO.GOV (last accessed Nov. 6, 2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml.
51
Sequestration refers to the automatic budget cuts made in accordance with the
th
Budget Control Act of 2011, S. 364, 112 Cong. (2012). Sequestration forced the
patent system to experience a 5% budget reduction. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE JOINT
COMMITTEE SEQUESTRATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 (Mar. 1, 2013), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/fy13ombjcse
questrationreport.pdf.
52
See 2013 Patent Litigation Study, PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS LLP 5 (2013),
48
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This Comment argues that the Executive Branch’s entrance into
the patent troll hunt will be ineffective at stopping patent trolls—
perhaps even detrimental to the patent system—because it does not
address abusive litigation tactics. Furthermore, regulation of the
patent system should be reserved for Congress. Part II of this
Comment provides a brief background of recent attempts to limit
patent trolls, and discusses the Executive Branch’s proposals first
offered in July 2013. Part III evaluates the merits of each of the
Executive Branch’s proposals and the likely impact each will have on
both the patent system and the ending of the abusive patent litigation
techniques often employed by patent trolls. Part IV of this Comment
provides alternative suggestions to help end abusive patent litigation
without relying on presidential intervention and suggests that
Congress thoroughly consider these options. Part V of this Comment
concludes that the Executive Branch’s proposals will, at best, provide
only a marginal solution to the patent troll problem, and that the
patent system will be better served by congressional intervention and
consideration of ideas that have yet to be thoroughly explored.
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ACTIONS AND
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. Previous Attempts to Stop Patent Trolls
Congress has acknowledged that patent trolls pose a problem to
the intellectual property industry and has taken several affirmative
steps aimed at curbing the patent troll problem. Congress initially
identified patent trolls as problematic and first attempted to stop
patent trolls when the House of Representatives proposed the Patent
Reform Act (PRA) of 2005.53 This piece of legislation specifically
targeted patent trolls by making it more difficult to obtain injunctive
relief in patent litigation matters.54 Although not implemented in
2005, this concept persevered and was included as part of the unenacted Patent Reform Acts of 200755 and 2009,56 until it eventually
appeared as law in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act57 (AIA), which
available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/
2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
53
H.R. 2798, 109th Cong. (2005).
54
Chan & Fawcett, supra note 18, at 9 (“It appears directed (in part) to tipping
the scales against issuing an injunction where the plaintiff is not a competitive entity
with a business, as opposed to [a] purely financial, interest in its lawsuit.”).
55
H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
56
H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009).
57
H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted).
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became fully effective on March 16, 2013.58
Although the AIA is most commonly noted for forcing the
American patent system to transition from a first-to-invent system to a
first-inventor-to-file system,59 the law may have also made it easier for
patent trolls to file mass applications, shifting the burden to initiate
patent litigation onto legitimate inventive entities.60 Despite this, many
of the provisions of the AIA were subject to criticism, and
commentators determined that it effectively limited the rights of small
inventors by forcing them to race to the patent office in order to secure
patent protection for their inventions.61 The fact that many large
corporations led the way in lobbying for the AIA to become law
supports this criticism.62 These corporations include Fortune 500
names such as Apple, Cisco, Google, HP, Microsoft, and Intel, all of
which have impressive patent portfolios.63
In order to counteract some of the negative effects caused by
stepping away from a first-to-invent system, the AIA also provides
smaller inventors with minor relief through the creation of a new
“micro-entity” status.64 By allowing certain individuals who certify their
status as a small entity65 to pay fees that are reduced by as much as 75
percent,66 Congress reduced the financial burden many small
inventors, who traditionally lack a strong financial backing when
applying for a patent, faced. Because certification of “micro-entity”
status also requires that a patent seeker file only a limited number of
patents,67 Congress also ensured that patent trolls would not be able to
easily abuse the benefits of this status by filing a large volume of
applications to create a portfolio of non-practiced inventions.

58

Id.
See 35 U.S.C. § 100(i) (2006).
60
Paul R. Gupta & Alex Feerst, The US Patent System After the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 2012, at 60, 61 (2012).
61
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Case, How the America Invents Act Hurts American Inventors and
Weakens Incentives to Innovate, 82 UMKC L. REV. 29 (2013).
62
See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J.
449, 451 (2010).
63
Case, supra note 61, at 46.
64
35 U.S.C. § 123 (2006).
65
The requirements necessary for an inventive entity to be classified as a small
entity permitting the payment of small entity fees are outlined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a)
(2013).
66
Certified small entities are eligible for a fifty percent fee reduction while
certified micro entities are eligible for a seventy-five percent fee reduction. 35 U.S.C.
§ 123 (2012).
67
Id. § 123(a)(2).
59
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B. Presidential Intervention
Shortly after the AIA went into full effect on March 16, 2013, the
Executive Branch issued a press release describing its plan to solve the
patent troll problem through five Executive Actions and seven
legislative suggestions.68 Despite two broad categories of suggestions,
there is significant overlap between many of the proposed initiatives.
This section briefly explains the Executive Actions and the Executive
Branch’s proposed legislation—along with each item’s intended effect
on the patent system—in order to provide the background necessary
for meaningful evaluation of how these proposals are likely to affect
both patent trolls and innocent bystanders. Further discussion of the
impacts of each proposal appears in Part III of this Comment, infra.
1. The President’s Executive Actions
Through its first proposed Executive Action focused on patent
trolls, the White House explained how it plans to implement a “Real
Party of Interest”69 requirement for patent applicants and patent
holders. This initiative would require patent applicants and owners to
regularly update ownership and assignment information when
practicing before the USPTO.70 Under the proposal, this information
would be required whenever a new patent application is filed, a patent
is issued, a patent is assigned, or a patent maintenance fee is paid.
The Executive Branch’s second action is aimed at “tightening
functional claiming.”71 This proposal intends to make it more difficult
for an applicant who claims an abstract or overly broad invention to be
issued a patent. This provision also gives direction to the USPTO to
implement new training that will help patent examiners further
scrutinize overly broad claims.72 This adds to the restrictions imposed
by the AIA, which places limitations on certain method claims such as
tax strategies.73
The third Executive Action hopes to “empower downstream
users.”74 In addition to targeting product makers and sellers, patent
trolls sometimes also target the end-users of allegedly infringing
68

White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
70
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
71
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
72
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
73
See H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 14 (2011); see also Nichelle Closson, Comment, Tax
Strategy Patents after the American Invents Act: The Need for Judicial Action, 38 IOWA J. CORP.
L. 159 (2012).
74
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
69
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inventions. For example, some trolls have chosen to target businesses
that use common technologies such as point-of-sale software75 and free
public Wi-Fi.76 Another patent troll has even claimed that any person
or business who sends JPEG images via email has infringed one of his
patents.77 In many of these cases, patent trolls usually target small
mom-and-pop retailers, hotels, or coffee shops that are unlikely to be
fully aware of their legal rights.78 This Executive Action aims to stymie
these infringement claims by providing educational materials to the
public, which explain the basic steps someone should take when an
infringement action is brought against him.
The White House’s fourth Executive Action aimed at stopping
patent trolls is to “expand dedicated outreach and study.”79 This
scholarly provision intends to encourage intellectual growth within the
patent system. Specifically, it aims to foster ongoing correspondence
and roundtable discussions among the American patent system’s
stakeholders, including federal agencies involved in the enforcement
of patent rights such as the USPTO, the Department of Justice, and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The White House intends to
implement this Executive Action by hosting “six months of high-profile
events across the country to develop new ideas and consensus around
updates to patent policies and laws.”80 Furthermore, the White House
stated its goal to expand the USPTO’s Edison Scholars Program by
engaging more academic experts to conduct research and share data
that may have an impact on issues related to abusive litigation.81
Unfortunately, as will be discussed in greater detail below, these
educational efforts will likely fall short of actually addressing the
problems that stem from patent trolls’ abusive litigation tactics.

75

White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
Mike Masnick, Patent Troll Says Anyone Using WiFi Infringes; Won’t Sue Individuals
‘At This Stage’, TECHDIRT.COM (Oct. 3, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/
blog/wireless/articles/20111001/00365416161/patent-troll-says-anyone-using-wifiinfringes-wont-sue-individuals-this-stage.shtml.
77
Laura Sydell, Taking the Battle against Patent Trolls to the Public, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Aug. 30, 2013, 5:21 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/08/
30/217272814/taking-the-battle-against-patent-trolls-to-the-public/.
78
See Gregory Thomas, Innovatio’s Infringement Suit Rampage Expands to Corporate
Hotels, THE PATENT EXAM’R (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.patentexaminer.org/2011/
09/innovatios-infringement-suit-rampage-expands-to-corporate-hotels/.
79
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
80
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
81
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
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The fifth and final Executive Action proposed by the Executive
Branch is to strengthen the enforcement process of exclusion orders.82
This action takes aim at international patent infringers. Currently,
when the International Trade Commission (ITC) determines that an
imported or exported product is infringing another party’s patent, it
consults with United States Customs and Border Protection—an
agency within the United States Department of Homeland Security—
to enforce an exclusion order.83 Sometimes, however, only a minor
product change can be sufficient to allow an infringer to escape the
scope of the exclusion order, thus bypassing it completely.84 This
provision states that the United States Intellectual Property Officer will
investigate enforcement activities and work with the ITC on finding
improvements that will help make the process more efficient, effective,
and transparent.85
2. The President’s Legislative Proposals
In addition to the aforementioned Executive Actions, President
Obama also suggested seven pieces of legislation. Many of these
legislative proposals mirror the implementations specified in the
Executive Actions, and therefore, do not operate independently. For
instance, both the Executive Actions and legislative proposals contain
provisions pertaining to the “real party of interest,” thereby protecting
end-users and empowering the ITC. Despite this, there are several
legislative proposals that are not encompassed in the Executive
Actions.
The first proposed legislative action is related to the first
Executive Action, in that it is focused on providing transparency by
creating a “real party of interest” standard within the patent system.86
Although this proposal may seem novel, it has already been discussed
in Congress and proposed in legislation such as the End Anonymous
Patents (EAP) Act.87 The EAP Act requires the real party of interest be
identified at the time a new patent is issued, at the time maintenance
fees are paid, and within ninety days of any action in which the
82

White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
See About the United States International Trade Commission, U.S. INT’L TRADE
COMM’N, http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2014).
84
See Timothy Q. Li, Essay, Exclusion Is Not Automatic: Improving the Enforcement of
ITC Exclusion Orders Through Notice, a Test for Close Cases, and Civil Penalties, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1755 (2013).
85
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
86
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
87
H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (2013).
83
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ownership interest in a patent or a patent application is sold, granted,
or conveyed.88
Next, the White House stated that it would like to give courts more
discretion when determining whether a prevailing party in a patent
case is entitled to fees.89 This would require modifying 35 U.S.C. § 285,
which covers sanctions in patent lawsuits. The Executive Branch
suggests adopting a standard similar to that which currently applies to
copyright infringement cases, where the courts have discretion to
“allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the
United States.”90
Similar to the standard used for copyright
91
infringement , this modification would allow for the recovery of
reasonable attorney’s fees.
The President’s third legislative suggestion is to expand the
USPTO’s transitional program.92 This would permit a wider range of
challengers to petition for review of issued patents before the Patent
Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB).93 The goal of this suggestion is to
make it easier for third-parties to challenge the validity of computerenabled and software patents.94 The idea is that patent trolls who seek
overly broad business method and computer-based patents would be
targeted, their claims would be declared invalid, and they would then
be unable to exploit their patents against third-parties. Therefore,
rather than targeting abusive litigation, this proposal aims to make it
more difficult to obtain a patent in the first place and expands the
scope of challenges currently facing the PTAB.95
The fourth legislative proposal is markedly similar to the third
Executive Action in that it also intends to help protect end-users of
products.96 This proposal aims to provide protection to end-users who
purchase and use a product for its intended purpose. The proposal
also suggests staying judicial proceedings against end users when a
vendor, retailer, or manufacturer is also being sued under the same
allegations of infringement.97 Therefore, while this proposal intends
to protect end-users from frivolous infringement actions, it truly just
88

Id.
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
90
17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
91
Id.
92
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
93
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
94
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
95
Similarly to the USPTO, the PTAB is currently experiencing a severe backlog of
ex parte appeals. See Data Visualization Center, supra note 50.
96
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
97
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
89
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changes the party that is likely to be sued by a patent troll. Admittedly,
this may protect innocent victims who cannot afford to put on their
own defenses, but it does not stop patent trolls from initiating abusive
litigation, although it may make them less confident in their litigation
tactics.
The Executive Branch’s fifth legislative suggestion is to change
the ITC standard for obtaining an injunction.98 Since the ITC is a
federal agency and not a court, it does not always follow the rules set
forth by the Supreme Court and is not bound by Supreme Court
decisions or precedent.99 Despite this, aggrieved parties can file an
appeal from an ITC decision in federal court.100 This creates an
incredible strategic advantage for a patent troll who can
simultaneously pursue an alleged infringer in both the court system
and the ITC by claiming that it has become the victim of an “unfair
trade practice.”101 Additionally, the Executive Branch suggests that the
four-factor test used in eBay v. MercExchange102 be adopted by the ITC
to require a plaintiff to show that he has been irreparably harmed, that
remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate him for the
alleged injury, that a remedy of equity is permissible, and that the
public interest would not be disserved by the issuance of a permanent
injunction.103
A sixth legislative recommendation has the goal of stopping
abusive lawsuits by requiring that demand letters be more
transparent.104 In order to implement this process, the legislative
recommendation suggests incentivizing the public filing of demand
letters in such a way that they are easily accessible and easily searchable
to the public. This proposal is closely related to the “real party of
interest” recommendations found in the Executive Branch’s first
Executive Action and first legislative proposal, and intends to enable
the public to become more aware of the names of businesses and
persons who file large volumes of infringement actions.

98

White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
See, e.g., 2 Admin. L. & Prac. § 5:67 (Charles H. Koch, Jr., 3d ed. 2010).
100
See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2012).
101
See Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at
the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63 (2008) (discussing how
patent trolls often make use of the court system and the ITC simultaneously in order
to bring an infringement action).
102
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
103
Id.
104
White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
99
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The final legislative proposal seeks to grant the ITC more
flexibility in hiring Administrative Law Judges.105 This proposal is likely
being used to encourage the ITC to hire additional judges so that it
can meet the demands of the increased case load it has experienced in
recent years.106 As will be discussed infra, however, this proposal is
largely unrelated to the patent troll problem, despite its possible
benefits.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE EXECUTIVE ACTIONS AND
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
As discussed above, Congress has typically been left with the task
of creating laws related to the patent system because this power is
specifically provided for in the United States Constitution.107 This is
one reason why it is particularly interesting that the White House has
decided to enter and police the patent realm. Not only is it rare for
the President to explicitly direct the policies and rules surrounding
patent law,108 but it may also be a cause for concern as the Executive
Branch may not have the proper knowledge or experience to bring
about effective changes within the intellectual property system.
Although the President’s suggestions try to cover many different
aspects of the patent system, they lack a clear and defined focus.109
Additionally, the Executive Branch’s lack of expertise causes it to fail
to adequately address the most critical way in which patent trolls
exploit the patent system: abusive patent litigation. Furthermore, in
acknowledging the severity of the patent troll problem, the President
himself has called on Congress—the appropriate body to address such
an issue—to take the steps necessary to put a stop to abusive patent
litigation.110
105

White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
From FY 2000 to FY 2011the ITC’s Section 337 caseload for investigations into
allegations of unfair practices in import trade had increased by over 530 percent. See
Conversations with the Honorable Dick Thornburgh, Deanna Tanner Okun, Paul Roeder,
WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION (Spring 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0041b.pdf.
107
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
108
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 49.
109
In the seven legislative recommendations and five Executive Actions, many
different areas of the patent system are discussed, including ITC involvement, the basis
on which patents should be granted, the identification of patent holders during the
course of litigation, and the provision of education and protections to the public.
None of these directly addresses limiting the number of abusive lawsuits filed or how
to make it more difficult for a party to initiate an abusive patent infringement action.
See White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
110
Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, State of the Union
Address (Jan. 28, 2014) (“And let’s pass a patent reform bill that allows our businesses
106
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As discussed supra, abusive patent litigation has significant
implications for the United States economy,111 and it is unlikely that the
patent troll problem will fix itself in the near future. More likely, the
problem will continue to expand until abusive litigation is effectively
ended by new legislation. Patent trolls are estimated to have accounted
for approximately sixty-two percent of patent litigation as of 2012.112
This constitutes approximately 2,900 lawsuits per year113 and represents
a significant increase over estimates from prior years.114 Furthermore,
patent trolls often try to name multiple defendants in order to
maximize their probability of recovery in lawsuits via settlements,
licensing agreements or, more rarely, verdicts and judgments.115 These
numbers emphasize the importance of ending abusive litigation
practices, a sentiment echoed by former CAFC Chief Judge, Randall R.
Rader.116
In addition, many of the Executive Branch’s suggestions have
already been addressed by Congress through proposed legislation.
Once a piece of legislation is presented to Congress, it is usually
recommended to a committee that has specialized expertise in
evaluating whether the proposal will be effective and can be
implemented in a manner such that its negative consequences are
minimized. This technique, rather than presidential intervention, is
much more likely to be effective in eliminating abusive patent
litigation and will be discussed more thoroughly in Part IV, infra.
A. Proposals Affecting Patentee Identification
Many of the White House’s proposals are focused on greater
transparency and more effective identification of patent holders. The
“real party of interest” requirements embodied in the first Executive
Action and first legislative proposal, along with the encouragement of
demand letter transparency in accordance with legislative
recommendation six, are primarily focused on preventing a patent
troll from hiding within a “shell” entity.
to stay focused on innovation, not costly, needless litigation.”).
111
See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 32.
112
See Colleen V. Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers, SANTA CLARA LAW DIGITAL
COMMONS (Mar. 3, 2013), available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/
609/.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
See, e.g., Randall R. Rader, Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 4,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay-incourt.html.
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Analysts throughout the intellectual property community
anticipate that these provisions will only have a “de minimis impact,”
in part because “patent trolls don’t profit from anonymity.”117 Effective
patent trolls view their activity as a business model, not as a game of
secrecy. Although it is true that patent trolls often do try to hide their
identities through the use of “shell” companies in an attempt to avoid
counterclaims,118 trolls are not concerned with whether third parties
know who they are, so long as they are still turning a profit.119 This is
illustrated by the fact that although some of the most tenacious patent
troll entities—such as Intellectual Ventures, which is known to have
over 1,200 shell companies with a worldwide patent portfolio
containing approximately 60,000 patents120—have received massive
amounts of negative publicity, they continue to play the patent troll
game of trying to obtain licensing fees through abusive litigation based
on illegitimate claims of patent infringement.
In addition to inadequately combating patent trolls, there is also
the possibility that these provisions will have a negative impact on small
inventive entities. For instance, the “real party of interest” provisions
may enable large companies to find smaller parties who hold the legal
rights to various inventions but wish to remain secret. Larger
corporations may attempt to use identifying information to their
advantage by overpowering smaller companies with threats of costly
litigation or the use of corporate espionage.121 Alternatively, larger
companies may intentionally infringe against a smaller entity that they
know does not have adequate resources to protect its own patent
rights. If a large company is infringing a small inventor’s invention,
that inventor may not have the financial capability to bring an
infringement action, or he may simply choose not to bring an action
because he is certain that he will not be able to win against a larger
company full of lawyers and financial resources.

117

Hsieh, Sylvia, Will Obama’s Proposals Rein in Patent Trolls?, THE DAILY RECORD
NEWSWIRE (June 12, 2013), available at http://www.legalnews.com/detroit/1377007/
(quoting Anthony Biller).
118
Daniel J. McFeely, Comment, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights to Those
Who Misuse the U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 289,
294 (2008).
119
Id.
120
Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1,
24 (2012).
121
Corporate espionage refers to uncovering a competitor’s trade secrets, business
methods, intellectual property, or other secret information by dishonest means. See
18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012).
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Although larger companies may use the “real party of interest”
requirement to their advantage, they are not entirely immune to the
possible negative effects of this provision. By being forced to disclose
the “real party of interest,” companies may be required to provide
information that exposes their otherwise confidential, commercial
business strategies, such as the specific corporate structure used to
manage their intellectual property. Therefore, the ability of larger
corporations to implement effective intellectual property
management techniques may become limited.122 These limitations
may hurt these companies’ economic growth and add additional
management burdens.
As a whole, “real party of interest” requirements do not effectively
combat the patent troll problem. Of course, these requirements allow
a defendant facing patent-infringement charges to have more clarity
in identifying the party who has sued him, but this does not stop an
abusive infringement lawsuit from being filed in the first place.
Without doing anything to effectively reduce the number of lawsuits
patent trolls file, the patent troll problem cannot be adequately
addressed simply through greater transparency and “real party of
interest” requirements.
B. Educational Efforts and End User Protections
A second broad category of the White House’s proposals to stop
patent trolls is aimed at education. In many instances, the goal of
education is to protect end-users from abusive litigation. While
educating the public is a noble cause based primarily on good
intentions, it is hard to see how these proposals will be able to
effectively stop patent trolls from initiating abusive litigation.
The public is not completely unaware of the problems associated
with patent trolls. Patent trolls and their abusive litigation tactics are
often publicized in the media, thus creating public awareness.123 Of
course, it is impossible to document or publicize every instance of

122

For an overview of emerging intellectual property management techniques, see
William W. Fisher III & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Strategic Management of Intellectual
Property – An Integrated Approach, CAL. MGMT. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) (Feb. 17, 2013),
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/faculty-workshops/fisher.faculty.
workshop.summer-2013.pdf.
123
Simply searching for “patent trolls” on an Internet news search engine yields a
significant number of results related to patent trolls, and a significant number of the
results have negative connotations associated with them. See, e.g., Edward J. Black,
Senate Needs to Stop Patent Trolls, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/edward-j-black/senate-needs-to-stop-patenttrolls_b_469646
6.html.
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abusive litigation brought forth by a patent troll, but the general public
has been put on notice about the tactics and effects of patent trolls.
Furthermore, designation as a “patent troll” comes with a largely
pejorative meaning.124 Even someone who is unfamiliar with the
commonly used definitions of patent troll would at least be able to
ascertain the negative connotation associated with the word “troll.”
Within the intellectual property community, patent trolls receive
even more scrutiny than they do in society at large. Law review articles
discussing patent trolls have been published since the term first came
into use. Patent-focused websites and blogs, such as Patently-O, have
thousands of users125 that actively discuss issues facing the patent
system, including trolls. Many of these users are patent examiners,
registered patent agents, or licensed patent attorneys—all of whom are
active stakeholders in the intellectual property community. In many
of these conversations, strategies to end abusive litigation are
discussed, and patent trolls are further vilified for their abuse of the
patent system.
Even if education provides the general public with the knowledge
necessary to evade a patent troll, this effort will only go so far. Shortly
after implementation, the general public may have a slightly increased
understanding of how the patent system works and the threats that
patent trolls pose. This understanding, however, does nothing to
impede the efforts of patent trolls. Patent trolls will still be able to file
lawsuits in the same manner and volume that they do today, and the
only benefit to an unsuspecting defendant is that he now knows the
definition of a patent troll. Furthermore, many patent trolls are very
profitable and can easily spend money on expensive legal counsel or
other expenditures to keep their business going, even if more
knowledgeable defendants become less willing to quickly back down
or settle.126 Because of this, any educational efforts in place would
require continuous updating in order to be relevant and effective.
Educational efforts alone will not be able to end the abusive
patent litigation used by patent trolls, given that patent trolls are
already an identified problem. Because of this, it is unlikely that these
efforts will have a significant impact, if any, on the abusive tactics
commonly employed by patent trolls in the near future. Despite these
inadequacies, improving education about the patent system and the
dangers of patent trolls may be a worthwhile expenditure if properly
124

Sandberg, supra note 13.
Patently-O advertises that it has over 19,000 daily subscribers. See PATENTLY-O,
http://www.patentlyo.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
126
See Schumer, supra note 26.
125
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implemented. Rather than combating the patent troll problem,
constant updating of educational materials related to the patent system
based on the input of various stakeholders could potentially provide a
greater understanding of the American patent system as a whole and
encourage further innovation.
C. Tightened Functional Claiming
The President’s suggestion to tighten functional claiming builds
upon the AIA’s efforts to prevent overly broad patents from being
issued in the first place. Although the patent system’s integrity relies
on the fact that only deserving inventions should receive patent
protection, current provisions already address this concern by
requiring that a patent be novel, useful, and non-obvious.127 As
discussed infra, while it may be true that not all patents are truly useful
inventions in the eyes of many, the Executive Branch’s suggestion to
tighten functional claiming is unlikely to stop patent trolls and may
pose a significant risk to small inventors seeking patent protection.
Many patent trolls do not even create their own inventions.
Instead, they acquire the rights to a patent on the open market.128
Consequently, making it more difficult for certain types of inventions
to receive patent protection is unlikely to limit the effectiveness of
patent trolls because trolls will continue to purchase the rights to
already issued patents. By purchasing existing patents, larger patent
trolls do not have to spend significant amounts of money or assume
any of the risks associated with obtaining patent protection.
Therefore, if this provision were to have any impact on patent trolls, it
would be only on those holding a small number of self-made
inventions. Although these smaller entities may sometimes be patent
trolls according to common definitions, they are not at the root of the
patent troll problem.
Moreover, stricter limitations on functional claiming will
complicate the process by which an inventor gets a patent. This
provision would increase scrutiny from the USPTO and require the
inventor to take extra steps in preparing his application if he hopes to
have a patent issued. For instance, inventors and patent applicants
would likely be required to establish detailed glossaries explicitly
defining even common terms, thus placing an additional burden on
both patent applicants and patent prosecutors. Furthermore—and
127

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2012).
See, e.g., Daniel J. McFeely, Note, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights to
Those Who Misuse the U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
289, 294 (2008).
128
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perhaps even more detrimental to the core tenants of the American
patent system—under this proposal an unsophisticated individual
inventor who has filed his own patent application may have his
invention denied not because he has failed to meet the criteria for
patentability, but rather, because he has used overly broad language.
These procedural complications affect not only inventors and patent
prosecutors, but they will also compound the USPTO’s current
backlog and staffing shortages.129
Overall, despites their intentions, proposals aimed at tightening
functional claiming will not effectively help cure the patent troll
problem. Furthermore, the potential negative consequences of these
proposals are serious and may actually lead to both new and increased
problems and complications within the patent system.
D. ITC Reform
A number of the President’s suggestions—legislative proposals
five and seven as well as the fifth Executive Action—focus on taking
steps to reform the way in which the ITC handles patent matters.
Although these proposals contain elements that may benefit the patent
system, they do not adequately address issues related to patent trolls’
abusive litigation strategies. For instance, while granting the ITC more
flexibility in its hiring processes may help the organization better
manage its caseload,130 this does not directly affect patent trolls.
Instead, this would likely help address issues of international
infringement, as the ITC would be able to reach quicker resolutions
and operate more efficiently. Despite this, hiring flexibility still does
not address patent trolls.
The only ITC provision that may help curb patent trolls and
abusive litigation is the suggestion that the ITC adopt the four-part test
set forth in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange131 prior to the court’s granting an
injunction. Even with this provision, however, the overall effects of the
efforts aimed at reforming the ITC would be marginal, although, once
again, the ITC would be able to operate more efficiently and expedite
the way in which it handles issues related to unfair trade practices.
Unfortunately, this does not directly address the issues associated with
patent trolls. Luckily, however, despite the shortcomings and negative
consequences of several of the Executive’s other proposals, the
measures involving changes to the ITC do not have significant negative

129
130
131

Data Visualization Center, supra note 50.
Conversations, supra note 105.
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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impacts on small inventors or the overall patent system as a whole, and
would likely produce several benefits.
IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
The Executive Branch’s proposals include several good ideas, but
will be largely ineffective at actually stopping patent trolls and their
abusive litigation strategies. Although the President has a cabinet in
place that can advise him about the needs of various government
agencies and entities, the ability of this cabinet to effectively assess and
manage these needs pales in comparison to Congress’. With over
forty132 Congressional committees subdivided to create over one
hundred133 congressional subcommittees,134 Congress has the unique
ability to hold hearings in which it can obtain input from various
stakeholders, thus enabling its members to make informed decisions
regarding proposed changes, and providing lawmakers with access to
a wide variety of differing points of view. This oversight allows not only
for broad reform, but also for the ability to choose individual elements
of patent reform in a piecemeal manner, which is likely a better
approach to effectively evolving and moderating the patent system.135
Furthermore, as discussed supra, the United States Constitution
explicitly grants Congress power over the patent and copyright
systems,136 and the other branches of the federal government should
not usurp this power.
Despite the Executive Branch’s well-intentioned efforts to put an
end to patent trolls, there are other alternatives available, which have
the following advantages: small inventors are not put at a
disproportionate disadvantage; significant burdens are not placed on
the USPTO; and abusive litigation practices are more effectively
deterred. This section will discuss (1) Congress’ legislative efforts to
stop patent trolls, (2) proposals aimed at reducing the burden that
smaller inventive entities face, (3) alternative policing methods to
catch patent trolls, and (4) the techniques available to legitimate
132

As of December 2013, the United States House of Representatives had twentyone committees, and the United States Senate had twenty-one committees. For a full
list of current Congressional committees, see https://www.congress.gov/committees.
133
The United States House of Representatives has ninety-five subcommittees.
The United States Senate has sixty-eight subcommittees. Id.
134
Congressional subcommittees consider the details and specifics of a matter and
then report back to the full committee with their results. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 5 (2013).
135
See Christopher Norton, Retired Fed. Circ. Chief Urges Piecemeal Patent Reform,
LAW360 (Jan. 12, 2011, 5:18PM), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/219706/
retired-fed-circ-chief-urges-piecemeal-patent-reform.
136
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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patent holders that wish to bring a valid infringement action to
distinguish themselves from patent trolls.
A. Legislative Efforts
The most traditional way in which Congress can attempt to modify
patent law and the patent system is through legislation. At any given
time, there may be thousands of bills present before Congress.137 Each
is presented, evaluated by a committee or subcommittee, and
ultimately either approved or discarded due to votes in each house of
Congress.138 Then, the law is either enacted by the President’s
signature or vetoed.139 As will be discussed infra, Congress’ attempts to
stop patent trolls have focused primarily on issues related to abusive
patent litigation. Conversely, as argued in this Comment, the
Executive’s focus does not sufficiently address abusive patent litigation,
and instead, focuses on alternative methods that are unlikely to harm
patent trolls.
1. Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal
Disputes Act of 2013
Perhaps the most effective method to stop patent trolls and the
abusive litigation they often unjustly initiate involves the incorporation
of several provisions contained in the “Saving High-Tech Innovators
from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2013,”140 which
originally appeared before Congress in 2012.
Following its
introduction, the SHIELD Act was amended to be more inclusive of
non-software and non-computer-related patents and was reintroduced
in 2013.141 The SHIELD Act was referred to the Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet in April of 2013, but a
vote on the bill has yet to take place.142
The SHIELD Act is narrowly focused on ending abusive patent
litigation. The Act includes a provision that requires a party bringing
a patent infringement or patent invalidation lawsuit to post a bond, the
137

As of November 4, 2013, there are 5,969 bills currently before Congress. To
track the status of bills and resolutions, see Bills and Resolutions, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills (last accessed Nov. 6, 2013).
138
See The Legislative Process: How a Bill Becomes a Law and Legislative Terms,
NAT’L MENTORING P’SHIP (Sept. 2010), http://www.mentoring.org/downloads/mentoring_1278.pdf.
139
Id.
140
H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. (2012).
141
H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013).
142
H.R. 845 Actions, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://beta.congress.gov/
bill/113th/house-bill/845/actions
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amount of which is determined by the court, to cover the costs of the
litigation.143 The bond requirement would likely reduce the overall
number of infringement actions as parties would likely be hesitant to
file an infringement lawsuit unless they were certain that they would
be successful. Although this provision may appear to create a burden
on small inventors wishing to exercise their rights in an infringement
suit, there are several exceptions to the bond requirement, easing the
burden on certain inventive entities.
Original inventors,144 original assignees,145 patentees who can
provide documentation that they have taken significant steps or made
a significant investment in using the patent,146 universities,147 and other
recognized technology transfer organizations148 are all exempt from
the bond requirement. Additionally, even in instances where a
plaintiff fails to meet one of these criteria, the court has discretion to
determine whether a bond should still be assessed.149 This allows a
court to evaluate whether a party has a legitimate claim or is actually a
patent troll who is bringing a frivolous or abusive lawsuit prior to
initiating a bond requirement. The Executive Branch’s suggestions do
not contain, and do not communicate a need for, the judicial
discretion necessary to ensure fairness in patent litigation.
Overall, the proposed implementation of the SHIELD Act
presents a unique balance that is likely to reduce the number of
frivolous patent infringement and patent invalidation lawsuits, while
simultaneously preserving the rights of small inventors and non-profit
innovators. By reducing the number of lawsuits, a bond provision such
as that contained in the SHIELD Act could effectively reduce the
patent troll problem and decrease caseload burdens before the PTAB
and other courts. The general public would no longer be as severely
threatened by patent trolls, and small inventors would not have their
rights restricted or dissolved. In conjunction with other possible
solutions, a bond requirement could become the beginning of the end
of the patent troll problem.

143
144
145
146
147
148
149

H.R. 845(b), 113th Cong. (2013).
H.R. 845(d)(1), 113th Cong. (2013).
Id.
H.R. 845(d)(2), 113th Cong. (2013).
H.R. 845(d)(3)(A), 113th Cong. (2013).
H.R. 845 (d)(3)(B), 113th Cong. (2013).
H.R. 845(b), 113th Cong. (2013).
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2. Patent Abuse Reduction Act
A second piece of proposed legislation that is currently before
Congress and is also aimed at reducing abusive patent litigation is the
“Patent Abuse Reduction (PAR) Act of 2013,”150 which was presented
in May of 2013151 and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.152
The PAR Act introduces advanced pleading requirements, sets forth
procedures for joinder of parties, places restrictions on the discovery
process, defines relevant evidence, and allows courts to award the
prevailing party reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney’s
fees, in certain situations.153 Similar to the SHIELD Act, the PAR Act
includes a bond provision, but this is limited to requiring a party to
post bond only to cover the anticipated costs of discovery when that
party requests discovery outside the scope of the PAR Act.154
Like the SHIELD Act, the bond provision could deter abusive
litigants. Unfortunately, the PAR Act’s use of a bond requirement is
not as elegant as the SHIELD Act’s because it does not provide the
same balance used to protect the rights of small and individual
inventors. The PAR Act demonstrates that although there are some
general concepts—such as bond provisions—that seem to help address
the patent troll problem, the specifics surrounding their
implementation are crucial, as a one-size-fits-all approach would likely
have a disproportionately negative impact on some parties. Therefore,
legislators should focus on passing a bond provision similar to that of
the SHIELD Act, which provides relief for small inventive entities.
3. Patent Litigation and Innovation Act
The Patent Litigation and Innovation (PLI) Act of 2013155 is yet
another piece of legislation currently before Congress with the goal of
stopping patent trolls from engaging in abusive litigation. The PLI Act
sets forth new standards in pleadings, requiring a plaintiff in a patent
infringement case to fully identify the claims allegedly infringed, to
specify clear instances of infringement, and to disclose the “real party
of interest.” Although the PLI Act’s “real party of interest” may seem
similar to that proposed by the Executive Branch, it is markedly
150

S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013).
159 CONG. REC. 3763–65 (daily ed. May 22, 2013) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
152
For congressional actions taken on S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013), see S.103 –
Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, http://beta.congress.gov/bill/
113th/senate-bill/1013/titles (last accessed Dec. 4, 2013).
153
S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013).
154
S. 1013 § 4(b)(3)(B)(ii)(II), 113th Cong. (2013).
155
H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013).
151
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different in that, rather than requiring identification of the “real party
of interest” whenever the patent is discussed before the USPTO, it
requires disclosure only at the commencement of an infringement
action.
This nuance mitigates many of the negative consequences of the
President’s “real party of interest” requirement discussed supra, while
still maintaining the overall goal of preventing patent trolls from
hiding behind a “shell” during the course of patent litigation.
Furthermore, while the PLI Act would make the requirements for
pleadings in a patent infringement case more rigid, they are not
complex or difficult to decipher. This is an important distinction
because strict, yet simple, pleading requirements do not place a
significant burden on a party attempting to bring a legitimate patent
infringement action.
The PLI Act also takes steps to simplify the discovery process by
limiting discovery material to core documents, such as identifying
information and documentation specific to the operation of the
alleged infringing invention.156 If enacted, the PLI Act would also limit
discovery until claim construction157 has been completed by the court
during the course of a Markman158 hearing.159 Currently, patent trolls
sometimes abuse the discovery process by requesting millions of
documents160 in an attempt to pressure the opposing party into settling
the lawsuit.161 The imposition of discovery limitations as proposed by
the PLI Act would effectively disarm patent trolls of one of their most
effective weapons, and therefore, reduce their overall success rates.
4. Other Legislative Proposals
In addition to the aforementioned bills currently before
Congress, there are several other pieces of proposed legislation that
encompass similar ideas aimed at combating patent trolls. These bills
include the Patent Innovation Protection Act,162 the Stopping
156

Id.
“Claim construction” refers to “the interpretation and construction of patent
claims, which define the scope of the patentee’s rights under the patent,” which is a
process carried out by the court. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d
967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
158
Id.
159
H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013).
160
Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs, And Potential
th
Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet, 113
Cong. 45 (2013) (statement of John Boswell, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel of SAS Inst., Inc.).
161
Id.
162
H.R. 3349, 113th Cong. (2013). The Innovation Protection Act aims to give the
157
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Offensive Use of Patents (STOP) Act,163 and the Innovation Act.164
Although many of these acts include ideas that the Executive Branch
suggested, they also serve as evidence that Congress can effectively
develop legislation that will help put an end to abusive patent litigation
without the help of Presidential intervention.
Recently, several state legislatures have begun considering or
enacting bills that take affirmative steps to combat patent trolls at a
more local level.165 The success of these laws is still undetermined,
however, and only in May of 2013 did a state law first prosecute an
abusive patent troll.166 Furthermore, some commentators raise
concerns that state-based patent regulation may be preempted by
federal patent law.167 Pending the success of these state-based patent
troll laws, other states may also continue implementing similar pieces
of legislation.

USPTO more flexibility in its budget by creating a separate fund structure. The Act
allows the Director of the USPTO to use funds received from fees without the same
limitations as funds received from taxpayers.
163
H.R. 2766, 113th Cong. (2013). The Stopping Offensive Use of Patents Act aims
to make improvements to the transitional program for covered business method
patents.
164
H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013). The Innovation Act aims to heighten pleading
requirements in patent infringement cases, educate small businesses on how to protect
themselves from abusive patent litigation, and place limitations on discovery.
165
Vermont was the first state to pass a law targeting patent trolls and abusive
patent litigation. The bill, which is known as the Bad Faith Assertions of Patent
Infringement Act aims to end frivolous patent infringement lawsuits while not
interfering with federal patent law and legitimate patent infringement actions. See VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–4199 (LEXIS through 2013 adjourned session). Nebraska
Attorney General Jon Bruning has “declared war” on patent trolls and has given public
support to the Nebraska Patent Abuse Prevention Act, which is currently being
considered in the Nebraska legislature. See Timothy B. Lee, Nebraska’s Attorney General
has Declared War on Patent Trolls, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2013, 8:50 AM), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/12/nebraskas-attorney-generalhas-declared-war-on-patent-trolls/. See also Leg. of Neb., 103rd Leg., 2nd Sess., REQ
03798 (NE. 2013). Maine has also considered a bill similar to Vermont’s Bad Faith
Assertions of Patent Infringement Act to target patent trolls and end abusive patent
litigation. See Mal Leary, Maine Lawmakers Consider Limiting Patent Trolls, THE MAINE
PUB. BROAD. NETWORK (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.mpbn.net/home/tabid/36/
ctl/ViewItem/mid/5347/ItemId/31557/Default.aspx.
166
Complaint, Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC, No. 282-5-13Wncu (Super. Ct.
Vt. 2013), available at http://www.atg.state.vt.us/assets/files/Vermont%20v%20MPH
J%20Technologies%20Complaint.pdf.
167
See Thomas Carey, Patent Trolls in the Crosshairs: Vermont’s Aggressive Stance and the
Emerging Federal Response, LEXISNEXIS (Aug. 1, 2013, 4:10 PM), http://www.lexis
nexis.com/legalnewsroom/intellectual-property/b/patent-law-blog/archive/2013/0
8/01/patent-trolls-in-the-crosshairs-vermont-39-s-aggressive-stance-and-the-emergingfederal-response.aspx (discussing whether the Vermont law is “stillborn” because of
federal preemption).
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The number of proposed bills addressing patent trolls
demonstrates Congress’ interest in combating abusive patent
litigation. Novel techniques such as state-based legislation further
show the impact of the patent troll problem as well as highlight the
creativity that lawmakers have used in order to develop more effective
ways of addressing the patent troll issue. As time goes on and more
legislators develop an increased appreciation of the patent troll
problem, they are likely to write even more bills, perhaps with even
more creative strategies aimed at reducing abusive patent litigation.
B. USPTO Review of Infringement Claims
Another way in which abusive patent litigation can be stopped is
through more careful monitoring of patent infringement lawsuits by
the USPTO. Senator Charles Schumer and former Senator Jon Kyl
believe that requiring the USPTO to evaluate and certify patent
infringement claims prior to the commencement of a lawsuit will
effectively reduce abusive patent litigation.168 Reflecting this theory,
Senator Schumer has proposed a bill known as the Patent Quality
Improvement Act of 2013.169 Since this approach focuses on the
litigious aspects of the patent system, but also requires USPTO action,
it can be considered a “hybrid approach” to solving the patent troll
problem. Because of this distinction, this Comment considers it
separately from other legislative actions discussed above.
In addition to cutting down on frivolous patent infringement
lawsuits, Senator Schumer’s bill would also give examiners at the
USPTO an opportunity to take a second look at an issued patent when
a lawsuit is initiated to determine whether the patent is truly valid.170 A
second review may reveal details overlooked during the first review,
and these details may effectively invalidate a patent, thereby preventing
unnecessary patent litigation. Furthermore, this strategy does not
create an additional bar to obtaining a patent; therefore, it still rewards
small, inventive entities for actual ingenuity and technological
contributions.

168

See Ingrid Lunden, Senator Charles Schumer Targets Patent Trolls, Wants USPTO to
Review Infringement Suits Before They Head to Court, TECH CRUNCH (May 1, 2013),
http://www.techcrunch.com/2013/05/01/senator-charles-schumer-plans-bill-foruspto-to-review-patent-troll-suits-before-they-head-to-court/.
169
S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013).
170
Id.
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Thus far, Senator Schumer’s bill has received positive feedback
from patent industry analysts.171 Some view this approach to be a
similar, but better, alternative to fee shifting, because fee shifting may
scare parties into settling lawsuits rather than entertaining the idea of
engaging in an expensive legal battle.172 With this proposed strategy,
however, an innocent defendant in an abusive litigation proceeding
would not be forced to settle right away because the lawsuit may be
deemed invalid at the onset of litigation. Therefore, this approach
would be more effective in actually preventing abusive litigation and
frivolous lawsuits because it would make it impossible for a suit to
commence without the USPTO’s stamp of approval.
There are several possible downsides to this proposal, however.
First, by requiring USPTO involvement, the organization is further
burdened173 because it must train staff on the mechanics of this
approval process—a process which may also be subject to a large
volume of requests. Furthermore, by requiring USPTO approval,
smaller inventive entities may experience increased difficulty when
trying to assert their patent rights via an infringement lawsuit. In order
to account for this possible consequence, this bill should make use of
the fee structure and “micro-entity” status put in place by the AIA.174
This structure would prevent small patent holders from incurring
additional financial burdens when filing an infringement claim.
If properly implemented,175 taking into account the circumstances
surrounding not only large corporations with expansive patent
portfolios, but also the individual and other small inventors, this
proposal would likely reduce the thousands176 of lawsuits brought by
patent trolls each year. There are risks, however, associated with this
bill, and like all legislation, it should be carefully considered prior to
congressional approval.

171

See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Finally, a Bill to End Patent Trolling, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 23,
2013, 5:34 PM), http://www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/10/its-finally-here-abill-to-end-patent-trolling/.
172
S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013).
173
See Thomas & Breitzman, supra note 5.
174
35 U.S.C. § 123 (2012).
175
Some analysts suggest that combining this act with the SHIELD Act would cut
down on the most egregious patent troll lawsuits. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Chuck Schumer
to Introduce Patent Reform Bill to Make it Cheaper to Fight Back Against Patent Trolls, TECH
DIRT (May 1, 2013, 7:52 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/
20130430/22152622896/chuck-schumer-to-introduce-patent-reform-bill-to-make-itcheaper-to-fight-back-against-trolls.shtml/.
176
See Chien, supra note 111.
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C. “Vigilante” Patent Justice
Another interesting technique to reduce abusive litigation that
simultaneously stops infringers and gives patent trolls a warning allows
patentees—particularly large corporations with expansive patent
portfolios—to self-police against infringers. Rather than suing a patent
infringer and commencing a lengthy and expensive litigation process,
a company can take steps to stop the infringer without pursuing legal
action. For instance, Apple recently made use of a “buy-back” program
to repurchase infringing products from customers who have already
purchased the items.177 Apple’s program focuses on recovering
counterfeit power adapters for the iPhone, iPad, and iPod. Apple
claims that these counterfeit products may pose legitimate safety
concerns—a claim supported by allegations that a Chinese flight
attendant was fatally electrocuted by a counterfeit device.178 In
exchange for the infringing product, the company chooses to give the
consumer either the real product or a credit which could be used
towards the purchase of the real product.
Although the idea of companies pursuing “vigilante justice” in
order to maintain their patent rights may be unsettling to some, this
type of strategy has three key benefits. First, it helps remove “knockoff” products from the market which, in some industries, may raise
significant safety concerns. Second, programs such as these can
provide a company with a significant public relations boost.179 Finally,
this strategy provides a non-litigious option to companies who wish to
fight back against infringers but wish to differentiate themselves from
the patent trolls who are known for often utilizing abusive litigation
techniques. By pursuing a non-litigious remedy, large companies with
legitimate infringement claims avoid burdening the courts.
Additionally, these types of programs do nothing to harm the
intellectual property rights of legitimate small inventors, but they do
send a significant message to unlawful infringers that their
177

Apple has been accepting returns of USB adapters produced by third parties
since August 16, 2013. In exchange for a counterfeit or third party adapter, Apple
allows a user to purchase an Apple USB power adapter at a reduced price. To access
further information regarding the details of Apple’s program, see USB Power Adapter
Takeback Program, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/support/usbadapter-takeback/ (last
visited Nov. 4, 2013).
178
See Paul Mozur, Apple Investigates China iPhone Death Allegations, THE WALL ST. J.
(July 15, 2013, 5:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/07/15/appleinvestigates-china-iphone-death-allegations/.
179
See Adam Pasick, Apple’s iPhone Charger Take-back Program is Genius PR—and it
May Even Boost the Bottom Line, QUARTZ (Aug. 7, 2013), http://qz.com/ 112722/applesiphone-charger-take-back-program-is-genius-pr-and-it-may-even-boost-the-bottomline/.
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infringement will not be tolerated.
D. Working Requirements and Compulsory Licenses
All of the proposals discussed supra do not provide an immediate
or complete solution to the problems surrounding patent trolls.
Individually, they may improve the patent system by restructuring
several small areas, but the patent system’s current organization still
allows for patent trolls to operate. This problem may be more
efficiently alleviated, however, through the institution of a working
requirement and compulsory license system that guarantees continued
protection only to patentees who actually use or produce products or
services covered by their patents. Under a working requirement,
Congress could mandate that a compulsory license be granted to
anyone who wishes to use a patent that is not currently practiced, used,
or produced by the patent’s inventor or assignee. Thus, those who
wish to use a patented technology not currently practiced by its
inventor would have the right to do so while the patent holder receives
financial compensation for the use of his invention.
The idea of a working requirement is not new or novel. Many
countries outside the United States already use working requirements
and compulsory licenses within their local patent systems.180 In fact,
working requirements are included in the Patent Cooperation Treaty181
(PCT), an international agreement to which the United States is a
party. Specifically, the PCT mandates that no compulsory license be
denied to anyone wishing to use a patent that has not been used or
produced by the patentee within the past four years or within four
years of its filing date.182 Any compulsory license granted under this
provision is non-exclusive and non-transferrable, unless the transfer
occurs as part of the sale of an entire business enterprise.183 The idea
of a working requirement is not universally accepted, however, as other
pieces of international legislation, such as the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights184 (TRIPs Agreement),
provide that working requirements should not be instituted except in

180

See Compulsory License Provisions across Europe, ASS’N OF PATENT LAW FIRMS,
http://www.avidity-ip.com/assets/pdf/pageview_20070802161505.pdf (last visited
Apr. 25, 2014).
181
Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 5, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S.
231 (reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 978 (1970)).
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197.
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exceptional circumstances.185 Despite this provision of the TRIPs
Agreement, however, many European countries continue to make use
of working requirements and compulsory licenses.
Currently, the only embodiment of a working requirement within
the American patent system is the maintenance fee that a patentee
must pay to the USPTO every five years.186 If the fee is not paid, the
patent will lapse, and protection will be lost.187 The purpose of the
maintenance fee is to encourage a patent holder to make economical
use of his patent.
By eliminating the maintenance fee and
simultaneously instituting a working requirement via a compulsory
license system, patent holders would still be encouraged to practice
their patents, and the patent trolls who do not actually make or use
patented technologies would be stripped of much of their power.
Instead of being able to threaten alleged infringers with costly lawsuits,
patent trolls would now be forced to comply with the terms of a
compulsory license agreement. Furthermore, this provision would not
increase the difficulty of obtaining a patent or make a patent worthless
if it is not practiced; non-practicing patentees would still be
compensated through a set fee schedule for compulsory licenses.
A compulsory license system may actually benefit many small
entities and individual inventors as well. Currently, if a small inventor’s
patent is being infringed, he may be hesitant or unable to bring a
lawsuit against the infringer because of the associated costs. Under a
compulsory license system, however, a patentee would no longer have
to file a lawsuit in order to receive compensation for the use of his or
her invention, but instead, could likely exercise his rights through an
administrative action. This aspect could be implemented in a fashion
similar to the European model of compulsory licenses, whereby thirdparties simply apply to their national patent authority to obtain a
license.188 Furthermore, the reduction in the number of patent
infringement lawsuits brought on behalf of both patent trolls and
more legitimate entities would help alleviate the stress currently facing
the court system and increase overall judicial efficiency.

185

Michael LaFlame, Jr., The European Patent System: An Overview and Critique, 32
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 605, 610 (2010).
186
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a) (2013).
187
Id.
188
Andrew C. Mace, TRIPs, eBay, and Denials of Injunctive Relief: Is Article 31
Compliance Everything?, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 232, 247 (2009).
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Although it is likely that patent trolls would be negatively affected
by the institution of a working requirement and compulsory license
system, other legitimate entities may also oppose the implementation
of the associated stipulations.
For example, many colleges,
universities, and other research institutions often develop new
patentable technologies but do not utilize the inventions themselves.
Instead, they license their patents and use the proceeds to continue
other educational and research efforts. When their patents are
infringed, however, these institutions often file lawsuits that are very
similar in nature to those brought by patent trolls, and because of this,
some colleges and universities have even argued against patent reform
aimed at patent trolls, claiming that research institutions could suffer
negative consequences as well.189 These organizations are not patent
trolls, however. Instead, they often serve as leaders in new technology
development, and it is important that their activities are not
discouraged or constructively stopped by the implementation of a
working requirement.190 Therefore, if a working requirement were to
be added to the United States patent system, lawmakers should
consider including an exemption for these organizations similar to the
exemptions provided in the several other pieces of pending legislation
discussed supra.
Despite its potential effectiveness, a working requirement is not
something that Congress has thoroughly explored. Due to the benefits
discussed supra, however, the development of a working requirement
and compulsory license system is an idea that warrants significant
consideration. Unlike many of the President’s currently proposed
actions and some of Congress’ pending legislation, a working
requirement targets the heart of the patent troll problem. Instead of
attacking ancillary aspects of how patent trolls abuse the patent system,
working requirements eliminate significant amounts of abusive patent
litigation brought by non-practicing patentees and patent trolls.
Therefore, Congress—not the Executive Branch—should take the
time and effort to explore the benefits, and possible consequences, of
implementing a working requirement and compulsory license schema
189

Timothy B. Lee, Patent Trolls Have a Surprising Ally: Universities, WASH. POST
(Nov. 30, 2013, 11:05 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/
2013/11/30/patent-trolls-have-a-surprising-ally-universities/.
190
The USPTO reports that academic institutions account for approximately 4.3
percent of issued patents, and this number has risen consistently from when it was 0.2
percent in 1985. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES—UTILITY PATENT GRANTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969-2012, available at http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/univ_toc.htm (last updated Mar.
26, 2014).
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within the United States patent system.
E. Other Alternative Methods
There are myriad other ways in which the patent system could be
modified to deal with the patent troll problem. Several other
suggestions from within the intellectual property community include
encouraging lawyers to develop expertise in patent defense
strategies,191 encouraging patent defense attorneys to operate on a
contingent fee basis,192 joining defendants in order to team up against
patent trolls,193 and encouraging victims of abusive patent litigation to
fight, rather than settle, to reduce the overall success rate of patent
trolls.194
Others suggest fixing the patent system by making it more difficult
to obtain a patent by placing restrictions on how continuation
applications are filed.195 Unfortunately, plans such as these do not take
into account the current number of valid patents or the devious nature
of patent trolls. Additionally, as discussed supra, placing further
obstacles in the way of obtaining patent protection may have numerous
negative consequences, such as denying patent protection to
legitimate inventions.
Almost all possible patent troll elimination strategies have various
pros and cons that should be carefully evaluated prior to
implementation. And, as discussed supra, the Executive Branch should
not mandate this implementation. Instead, attempts to reduce the
negative impact of patent trolls should come from the body properly
situated to make changes to the patent system: Congress.
V. CONCLUSION
Patent trolls pose a significant threat to the integrity and
efficiency of both the patent and court systems. They bring frivolous
lawsuits, not because they care about their inventions, but because they
want to make money. They undermine parties who are faced with
legitimate patent infringement issues. They create unnecessary

191

See Chien, supra note 10.
See Chien, supra note 10.
193
See Chien, supra note 10.
194
Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, How to Get Rid of Patent Trolls for Good, BUS. INSIDER
(Aug. 17, 2011 3:16 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-get-rid-of-patenttrolls- for-good-2011-8/.
195
See James Bessen, The Power of No, SLATE (Dec. 4, 2013, 9:45 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/12/the_simple_fix_t
hat_could_heal_the_patent_system.single.html.
192
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burdens for courts tasked with hearing patent infringement cases.
They also threaten an American economy that has a significant stake
in patent-intensive industries and intellectual property in general.196
These problems cannot go unaddressed.
Despite the problems that patent trolls introduce, and the good
intentions that the White House displayed by entering into the hunt
for patent trolls, the Executive is not the appropriate branch of the
federal government to address these issues. Patent trolls and the
myriad of potential problems they cause should be assessed and dealt
with by Congress, which not only has explicitly enumerated
jurisdiction over patent-related issues,197 but also is in a better position
to regulate and continually modernize the American patent system.
The patent system, as with all legal entities, must continue to
evolve in order to address the challenges of a constantly changing
economy and society.198 This evolutionary process should request and
respect the input of all stakeholders, including Congress, the USPTO,
patent agents, patent attorneys, patent examiners, and inventors—
large and small, public and private. These stakeholders also have a
duty to seriously consider how the effects of the patent system’s
evolution will impact those who routinely use and rely on the system,
in addition to its impact on the American economy and the American
inventor’s way of life.
For now, it is unlikely that the patent troll problem will be stopped
by a wizard’s magical spell or a witch’s special potion. Instead, the
patent troll problem will need to be continually addressed by a much
less supernatural body: Congress. Although there are many possible
strategies available that could be used in the war on patent trolls,
Congress has not yet taken the time to consider them all. As time goes
on, however, the same creativity that inspires inventors to develop new
and exciting technologies may also be the “magical” inspiration used
by lawmakers to come up with new ways of effectively managing the
United States patent system and defeating the most notorious patent
trolls.
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